

MEETING DATE	Wed, 02 May 2018 9:30 am	TYPE	AGM	ISSUE DATE	Mon, 15 Oct 2018
MEETING LOCATION	Grand Ballroom, Sofitel Melbourne On Collins, 25 Collins Street, Melbourne, Victoria				
CURRENT INDICES	PIRC Global				
SECTOR	General Mining				

COMPANY OVERVIEW

Rio Tinto Group is a British-Australian multinational metals and mining corporation with headquarters in London, UK, and a management office in Melbourne, Australia. It is a dual-listed company traded on both the London Stock Exchange where it is a component of the FTSE 100 Index and the Australian Securities Exchange where it is a component of the S&P/ASX 50 index. The Company primarily focuses on extraction of minerals, but it also has significant operations in refining, particularly for refining bauxite. The Company has operations on six continents but is mainly concentrated in Australia and Canada, and owns its mining operations through a complex web of wholly and partly owned subsidiaries.

MEETING SPECIFIC INFORMATION

Quorum requirements and voting requirements

The meeting is quorate if at least two shareholders are present, unless the company constitution specifies another quorum. This quorum must be present for the duration of the meeting. If the quorum is not present within 30 minutes of time in notice, the meeting is adjourned.

Ordinary resolutions are approved if supported by more of 50% of the votes cast at the meeting.

Special resolutions are approved if supported by at least 75% of the votes cast.

PROPOSALS

ADVICE

1	<p>Receive the Annual Report</p> <p>Strategic Report meets guidelines. Adequate environmental policy is in place and relevant, up-to-date, quantified environmental reporting is disclosed. The proportion of women on the Board, in Executive Management positions and within the whole organisation is disclosed. However, it is noted that shareholders were not asked to vote on the dividend paid during the year, contrary to best practice. The company has not given shareholders of the PLC the opportunity to vote the shareholder resolutions being put to the Ltd AGM in Australia.</p>	Oppose
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- 2 Approve Remuneration Policy** **Oppose**
- The Company is removing a performance measure relating to relative EBIT margin improvement as it is described as being 'complex, opaque and impossible to track' during the performance period. Given this admission, it is inconceivable why it was chosen as a metric in the first instance. Vesting for Performance Share Awards (PSA) granted for 2018 will be subject two equally weighted measures of relative total shareholder return (TSR) against the Euromoney Global Mining Index and the MSCI World Index. Best practice is for at least two different metrics operating interdependently, with the inclusion of a non-financial performance metric. (ii) The Company is also seeking shareholder approval of a new umbrella agreement - the Equity Incentive Plan (EIP) which will govern all future long-term, share-based remuneration, including PSA and the deferred element of the STIP as well as restricted share awards. These changes are not considered sufficient to warrant support for the policy.
- Overall policy disclosure is acceptable.
- Total maximum potential awards under all incentive schemes are considered excessive at 638% of salary. The LTIP currently in operation is the Performance Share Award (PSA). Awards vest subject to RSR relative to two different indices. This is contrary to best practice as it is considered that awards should be subject to at least two performance metrics, operating interdependently. In addition, they should be linked to non-financial performance conditions. Dividend equivalents are permitted under the plan. Such rewards misalign shareholders and executive interests as shareholders must subscribe for shares in order to receive dividends whereas participants in the scheme do not.
- It is noted that in exceptional circumstances, an initial notice period of up to 24 months during the first two years of employment, reducing to up to 12 months thereafter, may be necessary to secure an external appointment. This is not considered appropriate. The Company states that no form of golden hello will be provided upon recruitment.
- 3 Approve the Remuneration Implementation Report** **Abstain**
- Overall disclosure is acceptable. However accrued dividends are not separately categorised.
- Appropriate discretion was used by the Board during the year, as given that fatalities occurred in 2017, reductions were applied as required by the Policy, with the safety results for the chief executive and the chief financial officer being reduced from 49.5% of maximum to 37% and 42%, respectively. The CEO's realised variable pay is considered slightly excessive at 210% of his salary. The CEO was awarded an LTIP equivalent to 400% of his salary which is considered excessive. However, the balance of CEO realised total pay with financial performance is considered acceptable as the change in CEO total pay over five years is commensurate with the change in TSR over the same period.
- 4 Approve the Remuneration Report** **Oppose**
- In accordance with Section 250R of the Australian Corporations Act, the directors are seeking approval of the remuneration report. The Act does not require directors to act on approval of the resolution and the vote is advisory.
- The maximum potential award under all the incentive schemes is 638% of salary which is highly excessive. As stated in resolution 3, the current variable pay of the CEO is also deemed excessive at more than 200% of salary. There are concerns over features of the Long Term Incentives (LTI) plan: no non-financial performance metrics are used and the performance conditions are not interdependent. The contract policy is also of concern as an initial notice period of 24 months, reducing to 12 months after two years, can be given for recruitment purposes. This can allow for excessive severance payments for Executives appointed under these terms. Upon termination, there are significant concerns with regards to the fact that the outstanding PSP awards, after the first 36 months from the date of grant, will not be pro-rated for period served. An oppose vote is therefore recommended.

5.A Approve New Long Term Incentive Plan

Oppose

Shareholder approval is being sought for the adoption of a new discretionary employee share plan, the Rio Tinto 2018 Equity Incentive Plan (2018 EIP) for executive directors and employees. However, the committee will decide who will be granted awards and over how many shares.

Plan Summary: Awards under the plan can take the form of (i) Conditional Awards - under which the participant receives shares for free automatically to the extent the award vests (which may be subject to the achievement of performance conditions); (ii) Forfeitable Shares - under which the participant receives free shares on grant, which must be given back to the extent the award lapses; or; (iii) Options - under which the participant can acquire shares, to the extent their award has vested, either at no cost or at a price set when the option is granted. The current intention is that awards will be made in the form of Conditional Awards to replicate awards currently made under the PSP, MSP and BDP and in line with the Group's Remuneration Policy. The inclusion of other award types is to provide for sufficient flexibility in the future should the Group's remuneration approach change during the life of the Plan. Awards may also be granted as cash awards. It is disclosed that the vesting of awards granted to executive directors (other than deferred bonus awards) will always be subject to a performance condition, except as otherwise permitted by the Group's Remuneration Policy. Dividend equivalents are permitted under the plan. Such rewards misalign shareholders and executive interests as shareholders must subscribe for shares in order to receive dividends whereas participants in the scheme do not.

There are certain concerns over the plan. These include: the flexibility to award different types of awards under one plan, the lack of disclosure of performance conditions and award limits and the discretion to disapply time pro-rata vesting for 'good leavers'. LTIPs are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance. These schemes are not considered to be properly long term and are subject to manipulation due to their discretionary nature.

5.B Approve potential termination benefits paid under the Rio Tinto 2018 Equity Incentive Plan

Oppose

It is proposed to approve for the purposes of sections 200B and 200E of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 the termination benefits given under the 2018 EIP that may be provided to individuals (Relevant Executives) who hold, or held in the last three years prior to cessation of employment a managerial or executive office, as defined in the Act, in Rio Tinto Limited or a related body corporate, including key management personnel (KMP) (which includes all Rio Tinto directors) and directors of subsidiary companies of Rio Tinto Limited.

The terms include discretion not to apply time pro-rating for awards subject to a performance conditions where the executive leaves on or after the third anniversary of grant which is not considered appropriate. Also it is noted that the Committee has discretion to vary the vesting date and/or the number of awards that vest. As such, an oppose vote is recommended.

6 Re-elect Megan Clark

For

Independent Non-Executive Director.

7 Re-elect David Constable

For

Independent Non-Executive Director.

8 Re-elect Ann Godbehere

For

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent.

9 Re-elect Simon Henry

For

Independent Non-Executive Director.

10 Re-elect Jean-Sébastien Jacques

For

Chief Executive Officer.

11 Re-elect Sam Laidlaw

For

Independent Non-Executive Director.

12 Re-elect Michael L'Estrange

For

Independent Non-Executive Director.

13 Re-elect Chris Lynch

For

Chief Financial Officer.

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|------------|---|--|---------------|
| 14 | Re-elect Simon Thompson | | Oppose |
| | Chairman with effect from the 2018 AGM. Considered independent on appointment. He is also Chairman of 3i Group Plc, a FTSE 100 company. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chairman should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. | | |
| 15 | Appoint the Auditors | | Oppose |
| | PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 22.38% of audit fees during the year under review and 16.11% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor. Opposition is recommended. | | |
| 16 | Allow the Board to Determine the Auditor's Remuneration | | For |
| | Standard resolution. Companies have legal duties to pay the auditors for their work. | | |
| 17 | Approve Political Donations | | For |
| | The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so. Within recommended limits. | | |
| 18* | Authorise Share Repurchase | | Oppose |
| | The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, an oppose vote is recommended. | | |
| 19* | Shareholder Resolution: Other Governance Issue | | For |
| | Proposed by Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility, together with a group of co-filing shareholders.
It is proposed to amend the Company's constitution to to enable shareholders, by ordinary resolution, to express an opinion, ask for information or make a request about the way in which a power vested partially or exclusively in the directors has been or should be exercised. The proposed amendment expressly provides that any shareholder resolution made pursuant to the proposed constitutional amendment would be advisory only and would not bind the directors or the Company. The Company has indeed set up channels for shareholder engagement, and it argues that this amendment would undermine the authority and accountability of the Board. On the other hand, it is considered that the wording of this proposal limits the scope effectively, so that only resolutions related to "an issue of material relevance to the company or the company's business as identified by the company" will be allowed, and the outcome will be not binding for the Company. On balance, it is considered that this shareholder proposal is reasonably scoped and maintains the management power within the Board, while potentially increasing the quality and effectiveness of meeting debate. Support is recommended. | | |

20* **Shareholder Resolution: Environmental Issues**

Abstain

Proposed by Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility, together with a group of co-filing shareholders.

It is proposed for the Company to review their relationships with industry bodies that act as blockages to progress towards the effective uptake of national and global climate and energy frameworks aimed at preventing a increasing temperatures. In particular, co-filing shareholders question the long-term attractiveness to shareholders of the company's public policy advocacy through the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), the NSW Minerals Council (NSWMC) and the Queensland Resources Council (QRC), organisations whose activities have diminished government's ability to resolve national policy issues, the proponents argue. The proponents further argue that Company's memberships of other relevant industry associations (such as the US Chamber of Commerce, the Mining Association of Canada, the Chamber of Mines of South Africa) should also be reviewed because of their position vis-a-vis climate risk, which proponents judge being potentially undermining shareholder value over time.

It is considered that companies should be held accountable for the policies of the associations of which they are member. However, the new approach to climate risk (included in the Energy & climate change policy statement published by the Minerals Council of Australia on 14 March 2018) gives sufficient evidence that the Company is effectively following up on its statements on climate risk, and engaged to change the policies of industry associations from within. On balance, abstention is recommended.

* = **Special resolution**

SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR RESOLUTIONS

Proposal 1 - Receive the Annual Report

The vote by shareholders on the dividend, on unqualified accounts, discharges the duties of the directors in tandem with the legal responsibilities of the auditors, and reaffirms the necessity of reliably audited accounts for financial governance to function properly.

Proposal 19 - Shareholder Resolution: Other Governance Issue

In Australia, the Corporations Act 2001 provides that 100 shareholders or those with at least 5% of the votes that may be cast at an AGM with the right to propose a resolution. In Australian legislation and its interpretation in case law, Australian shareholders are unable to directly propose ordinary resolutions for consideration at Australian companies' AGMs. Together with the common law, mean that shareholders cannot by ordinary resolution either direct that the company take a course of action, or express an opinion as to how a power vested by the company's constitution in the directors should be exercised. Australian shareholders wishing to have an ordinary resolution considered at an AGM have dealt with this limitation by proposing two part resolutions, with the first being a 'special resolution,' such as this one, that requires 75% support to pass and amends the company's constitution to allow ordinary resolutions to be placed on the agenda at a company's AGM.

COMPANY ENGAGEMENT

Following the publication of the report, PIRC has been engaged by and had dialogue with shareholders, on resolution 20. However, the initial recommendation to resolution 20 has been amended, after the reassessment of the new Energy & climate change policy statement, published by the Minerals Council of Australia.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HIGHLIGHTS

BOARD AND OTHER GOVERNANCE INFORMATION	AFTER MEETING
Size of Board	9
Average Disclosed Age of Directors	58
Average Tenure of All Directors	3.22
Average Tenure of Non-Executive Directors	3.0
Female Directors Representation	22.2%
Annual Election of Directors	No
Separate Chairman and CEO	Yes
The Company has a Lead Director	Yes
No Executive is On the Remuneration Committee	Yes
No Executive is On the Nomination Committee	Yes
No Executive is On the Audit Committee	Yes
Auditors tenure is less than five years	No
Audit fees and auditor's first date of appointment are disclosed	Yes
The Company Maintains a Corporate Jet	n/d

BOARD AND COMMITTEE COMPOSITION (post-Meeting)

BOARD CHANGES

John Varley, Senior Independent Director, resigned on 20 June 2017. Ann Godbehere assumed the role of Senior Independent Director. Paul Tellier, Non-Executive Director and Jan du Plessis, Chairman, will step down from the Board at the AGM. Simon Thompson will take over the role of Chairman. Moya Greene will join the Board as an independent Non-Executive Director in the second half of 2018. Ms. Greene will not be voted on at the 2018 AGM. She will first stand for election at the 2019 AGMs and as such will not appear in the Board table.

DIRECTOR	GENDER	INDEPENDENT BY		BOARD	AC	RC	NC	TENURE
		PIRC	COMPANY					
Simon Thompson	M	Yes	Yes	Ch	M	-	M	4
Jean-Sebastien Jacques	M	No	No	CEO	-	-	-	2
Chris Lynch	M	No	No	Exec	-	-	-	6
Megan Clark	F	Yes	Yes	NED	-	M	M	3
David Constable	M	Yes	Yes	NED	-	-	M	1
Ann Godbehere	F	Yes	Yes	SID	C	M	M	8
Simon Henry	M	Yes	Yes	NED	M	-	M	<1
Sam Laidlaw	M	Yes	Yes	NED	-	C	M	1
Michael L'Estrange	M	Yes	Yes	NED	-	-	M	4
Number of Meetings				9	6	9	7	
Number of NED only Meetings				n/d				

PIRC assesses a non-executive director's independence according to PIRC's shareholder guidelines. Comments represent PIRC's analysis based on information in the report and accounts. AC = Audit Committee, RC = Remuneration Committee, NC = Nomination Committee, C = Chairperson of Committee, M = Member of Committee.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS (post-Meeting)

SIMON THOMPSON			CHAIRMAN (NON EXECUTIVE)		
AGE	58	TENURE	4 Years	COMMITTEES	A,N
OTHER POSITION	3i Group plc [Ch]; ex-AMEC Foster Wheeler plc [NED]; ex-Anglo American plc [Exec]; ex-AngloGold Ashanti Limited [NED]; ex-Newmont Mining Corporation [NED]; ex-Sandvik AB [NED]; ex-Tullow Oil plc [Ch]; ex-United Company Rusal [NED]				
INDEPENDENT BY PIRC	Y	INDEPENDENT BY COMPANY			Y
JEAN-SEBASTIEN JACQUES			CHIEF EXECUTIVE		
AGE	46	TENURE	2 Years	COMMITTEES	None
OTHER POSITION	International Copper Association [Ch]; ex-Tata Steel Group [Exec]				
INDEPENDENT BY PIRC	N	INDEPENDENT BY COMPANY			N
COMMENT	He was Deputy Chief Executive. Appointed Chief Executive on 2 July 2016.				
CHRIS LYNCH			EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR		
AGE	64	TENURE	6 Years	COMMITTEES	None
OTHER POSITION	ex-AMT Management Limited [NED]; ex-Alcoa Inc [VP]; ex-Australian Football League [Commissioner]; ex-BHP Billiton [CFO, Dir, Pres]; ex-Citylink Melbourne Limited [NED]; ex-KAAL Australia Limited [MD]; ex-Minerals Council of Australia [NED]; ex-Sydney Roads Limited [NED]; ex-The Hills Motorway Limited [NED]; ex-Transurban Group [CEO]				
INDEPENDENT BY PIRC	N	INDEPENDENT BY COMPANY			N
COMMENT	Chief Financial Officer since April 2013.				

MEGAN CLARK		NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR			
AGE	59	TENURE	3 Years	COMMITTEES	R,N,C*
OTHER POSITION	CARE Australia [NED]; CSL Limited [NED]; ex-CSIRO [CEO]; ex-NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) [NED]; ex-Prime Minister's Science, Industry and Engineering Council [Mem]				
INDEPENDENT BY PIRC	Y	INDEPENDENT BY COMPANY		Y	

DAVID CONSTABLE		NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR			
AGE	56	TENURE	1 Year	COMMITTEES	N,C
OTHER POSITION	ABB Ltd [NED]; Anadarko Petroleum Corporation [NED]; Cerberus Capital Management [SAdv]; ex-Fluor Corporation [Group Pres]; ex-SASOL Limited [CEO]				
INDEPENDENT BY PIRC	Y	INDEPENDENT BY COMPANY		Y	

ANN GODBEHERE		SENIOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR			
AGE	62	TENURE	8 Years	COMMITTEES	A*,R,N
OTHER POSITION	UBS AG [NED]; UBS Group AG [NED]; ex-Arden Holdings Ltd [NED]; ex-Atrium Underwriting Group Limited [NED]; ex-British American Tobacco plc [NED]; ex-Northern Rock [CFO]; ex-Prudential plc [NED]; ex-Swiss Re [CFO]				
INDEPENDENT BY PIRC	Y	INDEPENDENT BY COMPANY		Y	

SIMON HENRY		NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR			
AGE	56	TENURE	<1 Years	COMMITTEES	A,N
OTHER POSITION	Advisory Panel of CIMA [Mem]; Centre for European Reform [Adv]; Lloyds Banking Group plc [NED]; PetroChina Company Limited [NED]; UK Defence Board [Mem]; ex-European Round Table CFO Taskforce [Ch]; ex-Royal Dutch Shell plc [CFO]				
INDEPENDENT BY PIRC	Y	INDEPENDENT BY COMPANY		Y	

SAM LAIDLAW		NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR			
AGE	62	TENURE	1 Year	COMMITTEES	R*,N,C
OTHER POSITION	National Centre of Universities & Business [Ch]; Neptune Energy Group Holdings Ltd [Ch]; Oxford Saïd Business School [Board Mem]; ex-Amerada Hess Corporation [Pres & COO]; ex-Centrica plc [CEO]; ex-Chevron Corporation [EVP]; ex-Enterprise Oil plc [CEO]; ex-HSBC Holdings plc [NED]; ex-Hanson plc [NED]; ex-UK Department of Transport [Exec]; ex-UK Prime Minister's Business Advisory Group [Mem]				
INDEPENDENT BY PIRC	Y	INDEPENDENT BY COMPANY		Y	

MICHAEL L'ESTRANGE		NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR			
AGE	65	TENURE	4 Years	COMMITTEES	N,C
OTHER POSITION	Qantas Airways Limited [NED]; University of Notre Dame [NED]; ex-Australian Government [Various positions]; ex-College of the National Security College [Head]				
INDEPENDENT BY PIRC	Y	INDEPENDENT BY COMPANY		Y	

BOARD COMPOSITION

BOARD COMPOSITION FOLLOWING THE AGM

	Number	% of Board
Executive Director	2	22.22
Independent NEDs	7	77.78
Connected NEDs	0	0.0
Other	0	0.0

BOARD COMMITTEES FOLLOWING THE AGM

	Number of Members	% Women	% Independent by PIRC	% Independent by Company
Whole Board	9	22.22	77.78	77.78
Audit	3	33.33	100.0	100.0
Remuneration	3	66.67	100.0	100.0
Nomination	7	28.57	100.0	100.0
CSR	4	25.0	100.0	100.0

BEST PRACTICE PRINCIPLES

BEST PRACTICE PRINCIPLE AND CRITERIA	ANALYSIS
A. Division of responsibilities at the head of the company	
1. There is a separate chairman and chief executive	Yes
2. The division of responsibilities between the executive chairman and chief executive has been established	Yes
3. An independent lead director is appointed, in the event the chairman is not considered independent	Yes
4. The Company reports on and discusses gender diversity on the Board	Yes
5. The Company is in line with local legal requirements on gender diversity on the Board, or has set targets for compliance	No
B. Independence on the board and election of directors	
6. At least half of the board comprises non-executive directors	Yes
7. At least half of the board is independent by PIRC guidelines	Yes
8. The Board comprises nomination, audit and remuneration committees	Yes
9. No alternate director has been appointed	Yes
10. All directors face election every year	No
C. Independent and transparent appointments and review process	
11. Recruitment practices for new directors are transparent	Yes
12. There is evidence that a process for succession planning exists and is regularly reviewed	Yes
13. No Directors on the board hold family ties	Yes
14. There is evidence that training needs for the board are regularly reviewed and acted upon	Yes
D. Auditors' independence	
15. Shareholders annually approve the appointment of the auditor	Yes
16. No director has had a significant connection with the auditors	Yes
17. Level of non-audit fees does not raise independence concerns	Yes
18. Auditor's date of appointment has been disclosed by the Company	Yes
19. Audit firm is subject to regular fixed-term rotation	No
E. Disclosure of the auditors' remuneration	
20. An adequate break-down between non-audit fees and audit fees has been provided	Yes
21. An adequate break-down of the nature of non-audit fees is provided	Yes
F. Audit committee's accountability	
22. Audit committee's policy on awarding non-audit work is described	Yes
23. The audit committee reviews "whistleblowing" arrangements	Yes
G. Effective Internal Controls	
24. An internal audit function exists or an explanation for its absence is provided	Yes
H. Shareholders' opportunity to vote on dividend or dividend policy	
25. Declared dividend or policy is put to the vote	Yes
I. All ordinary shares should have equal rights	
26. Each ordinary share has equal voting rights	Yes
27. There is no controlling shareholder	Yes
28. No controlling shareholder sits on the board	Yes
J. Voting by shareholders should be democratic and transparent	
29. All voting is conducted by poll	Yes
K. Other Best Practice Principle	
30. The company produces an environmental statement or report	Yes
31. ESG issues are reviewed as part of the company's overall risk management	Yes
32. There is disclosure on political donations made during the year under review	Yes
33. No political donations were made by the company during the year under review	Yes
34. The board considers that the company complied with the Corporate Governance Code in full for the whole period under review	Yes
35. Does the Company maintain one or more corporate aircraft?	n/d

AUDIT

Audit Firm	PwC			
Date Appointed	1995-03-01			
Tenure	23 Years			
Audit Partner	Liza Maimone			
Partner Appointed	2016-01-01			
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AUDITOR REMUNERATION - AUDm		2017	2016	2015
		PwC	PwC	PwC
<hr/>				
Statutory audit fee		14.3	13.5	14.4
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Acceptable non-audit work undertaken by the auditors				
<hr/>				
Audit-related, mandatory regulatory		3.3	1.5	1.8
Tax compliance		0.0	0.5	0.5
Subtotal Authorised		3.3	2.0	2.3
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Unacceptable non-audit work undertaken by the auditors				
<hr/>				
Other tax services		0.5	0.1	0.4
Acquisition-related		0.0	0.0	0.0
Other services		0.7	1.8	1.3
Total non-audit fees		1.2	1.9	1.7
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Company percentage of non-audit fees versus audit fees		8.39	14.07	11.81
Total Company three year percentage of unacceptable non-audit fees versus audit fees		11.0		

SHARE CAPITAL AND SHAREHOLDER RELATIONS

DISCLOSED ORDINARY VOTING RIGHTS

	PERCENTAGE
Shining Prospect Pte. Ltd	13.1
BlackRock, Inc.	8.38
The Capital Group Companies, Inc.	5.03

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